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Abstract  
Background  
Delirium is a common disorder in hospitalized older adults and has been defined as a 
disturbance of consciousness. Unfortunately, there is no testable measure of 
consciousness as pertains to its ‘clouding’ in delirium and rates of recognition of 
delirium suffer. A greater understanding of consciousness, and its disruption in 
delirium, may help us to develop clinical tools to aid diagnosis.  
Methods  
Our group have set out on this quest to help generate measurable facets of 
consciousness whose disturbance could signal delirium and pave the way for better 
diagnostics. Based upon existing literature in the field of consciousness we have 
explored pre-reflective state, experiential awareness and reflective versus the task 
positive state.  
Results  
From these states of consciousness, we have derived a set of potential questions that 
could be used to interrogate consciousness integrity.  
Conclusions  
Candidate questions can be used to measure state of consciousness that may have 
utility in the diagnosis of delirium  
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Introduction  
Delirium is a common disorder in hospitalized older adults and has been defined as a 
disturbance of consciousness.1 Just how consciousness is impacted in delirium 
remains uncertain, however, as is reflected in the diverse iterations of diagnostic 
criteria over recent decades. Unfortunately, there is no testable measure of 
consciousness as pertains to its ‘clouding’ in delirium. This would matter less if 
clinicians were adept at detecting delirium, which, by and large, they are not. In fact, 
up to 60% of delirium cases are missed.2 A greater understanding of consciousness, 
and its disruption in delirium, may help us gain a more robust conceptual foothold 
into this disorder.3 Our group have set out on this quest to help generate measurable 
facets of consciousness whose disturbance could signal delirium and pave the way for 
better diagnostics.  
The conventional pathway to arriving at a clinical diagnosis of delirium currently 
relies on more tangible facets of the disorder. In particular, the so-called sentinel gate 
of delirium, attention and its disturbance is central to the clinical diagnosis. An 
impaired ability to focus, sustain, or shift attention has spawned the use of bedside 
cognitive tests, incorporating measures, such as the ability to recite months of the year 
backwards.4 While this approach is feasible in practical terms, there are problems with 
being overly reliant on attention in the diagnosis of delirium. For instance, there are 
some candidate neurological territories responsible for attention, such as sensory 
cortices, during bimodal selective attention.5 However, widespread cortical and 
cerebellar connectivity required during tasks of attention make it difficult to easily 
reduce to a single neurobiological substrate even when a specific mode of attention is 
being targeted.6 Attention can also be difficult to measure in a standardised manner 
across a range of intellectual and educational , and in the setting of cognitive 
impairment.7 Additionally, there is a mounting argument that the inattention may be 
somewhat superfluous,8,9 insufficiently precise or sufficient, in and of itself, to make a 
diagnosis of delirium.10 More fundamentally, it would seem that while inattention is an 
important part of the syndrome of delirium it may not be central to the biological 
mechanisms.11 Ultimately, whilst attention and consciousness are coupled,12,13,14 they 
remain distinct entities.15 Thus, we need to more fully explore how consciousness 
might pertain to delirium.8,11 This is where we stumble across our first obstacle as the 
absence of clinical tools renders this problem academic.16,17 In order to shine a light on 
the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness18 we have brought together some accepted 
concepts in this field of study and considered relevance to delirium.  In so doing we 
hope to expand on ways in which we might be better able to diagnose this otherwise 
seemingly elusive and yet tragic condition. What follows is an attempt to explore the 
entity of consciousness and present some of these candidate questions that may test its 
integrity.  
* One of the most commonly and intensively researched screening tools has one of its 
four question relating to altered level of consciousness.19  
Materials and Methods  
We first set out the states of consciousness as described between the schools of 
neurology, neuropsychology, psychiatry and philosophy.  
Phenomenal me-ness or the pre-reflective state  
There is bountiful evidence to suggest that consciousness comprises a number of 
different states that exist as experientially distinct but interchangeable phenomena. 
Perhaps the most rudimentary of these is the pre-reflective state. Pre-reflective 
consciousness is a state of awareness prior to contemplation.20 Together, an implicit 
and first order sense of ownership and agency form part of the embodied subject of 
experience21,22 upon which other levels of selfhood are constructed.20  Pre-reflective 
thought is perceived by the conscious subject as part of the mind, i.e. it is recognised 
as a part of conscious experience that is always there, though we do not normally 
attend to it.23 In evolutionary and adaptive terms, the pre-reflective state allows us to 
‘take in’ before we ‘take stock’.24 Some authors debated whether pre-reflective state 
incorporates a first person dimension25  and posit that it may be divested in a feeling of 
self.26 For the purposes of inclusivity, however, we shall assume for the purposes of 
our argument that first person mineness is part of pre-reflective consciousness. 
Neurophysiologically, the pre-reflective self is characterised by activation of distinct 
regions that receive visceral and somatic afferents, such as the insula, somatosensory 
cortex 27,28 and subcortical-cortical midline structures.29  
Related to pre-reflective consciousness is the concept of minimal self, or the most 
fundamental level of the self.20 In the field of psychiatry the minimal self relates to an 
individual as aware of being the ‘immediate subject of experience’.30 Interference in 
this sensed experience is linked with psychopathologies.31 For instance, the minimal 
self of pre-reflective consciousness is perceived to be weakened in schizophrenia and 
psychosis .32,33,34 Symptoms of this aberrancy include delusions such as thought 
interference whereupon thoughts or ideas manifest seemingly outside of the self 35,36 
The ipseity-disturbance model proposes that heightened awareness of some of the pre-
reflective properties become interposed with a fading of the perception of self.33,34 
What results is a difficulty in demarcating self from non-self ,37 which is reflected in 
first -hand accounts including such features as ‘alienation from surroundings’.38 Such 
delusions have been attributed to aberrant cerebro-cerebellar and prefrontal cortical 
dynamic network connectivity 39,40 including reduced activity in the cognitive 
evaluation network.41  
Correspondingly, there is an argument that both schizophrenia 42 and delirium are 
disorders of consciousness 43,44 as they share many clinical features that potentially 
impinge on the notion of minimal self.** Rates of delusions (80%) and perceptual 
disturbance of  are observed in delirium and certainly chime with what is observed in 
schizophrenia.45 If such first rank symptoms derive from disruption in pre-reflective 
consciousness and disturbance in the coherence of minimal self, then this is likely also 
to be impacted in delirium. Clinical tools in schizophrenia have exploited impairments 
in the minimal self, such as the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) 
checklist46 which has in two of its five domains comprising traits of demarcation and 
self-awareness. Therefore, it is reasonable to derive clinical tools which may test these 
pre-reflective components of consciousness in delirium.    
**Among other theories such as neurodevelopmental, salience and glutamate theory. 47  
Consciousness-experiential awareness  
It is the nature of the sensed experience that represents an emergent feature of 
complex system features of consciousness (the phenomenon cannot be predicted by 
the sum of the parts) .48,49,50 Or, to borrow from the experientalist philosopher David 
Hume, it has been asserted that all knowledge of the physical world is acquired 
through the senses.51 Again, there is debate concerning the ability to operationalize of 
consciousness with respect to the senses.52 Nevertheless, there remains ample grounds 
to continue to examine the relationship between sensory modalities and 
consciousness. It is not only knowledge that may be gained but also feelings that are 
informed. For instance, the sound of waves in the ocean may be calming, seeing an 
old friend may be uplifting, and the touch of a spider may cause panic.53 At its most 
rudimentary, awareness of the environment through multisensory processing is an 
integral part of consciousness.54,55 The sensed experience may go beyond modulation 
of the qualia of a moment but interfere with the very state of consciousness.56,57 The 
neurophysiological correlates of multisensory sensory processing include but are not 
confined to superior parietal, temporo-parietal, and ventral premotor areas.58 When it 
comes to the experience of delirium it would seem to be a distinctly and universally 
unpleasant one, driven largely through corruption of the senses through perceptual 
distortion.59 So, it makes sense that a measure of awareness of the surrounding as part 
of the construct of consciousness should be grounded in an evaluation of perception 
and the senses. In addition to an experience being grounded in a medium, of taste or 
touch for instance, it is encountered within the dimension of time, or at least time 
perception [60].60 One such theory is the internal clock model based upon the number 
of impulses accumulated during and epoch of focussed attention.61,62 This perception 
can be distorted by illness, such as schizophrenia, ADHD and Parkinson’s disease.63    
Consciousness - the reflective versus the task state  
Hughlings Jackson in his treatise on the dissolution of the mind alluded to and 
perhaps founded an understanding of consciousness based upon hierarchies of mental 
processes.64 At the risk of injustice to this seminal work we can consider that as 
consciousness lifts itself out from a pre-reflective (and passive sensory state) it enters 
a higher cognitive moiety. This cognitive state comprises but is not confined to either 
one of creative thinking or a planning and doing state. The creative thinking, 
imaginary or reflective state is subserved through the  default mode network (DMN).65 
For example, the DMN is active when picturing oneself in a daydream. When the 
DMN is engaged in daydreaming, there is a reciprocal reduction of task engagement, 
purportedly controlled by the task positive network, or TPN.66 The TPN enables 
engagement with the outside world and is active during attention-demanding 
tasks.<="">It is argued that It is this interplay between the DMN and TPN that results 
in much of conscious thought.67  
Studies, employing functional neuroimaging, have demonstrated that the brain regions 
of the DMN include the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, 
precuneus, angular gyrus, and lateral parietal cortex.68,69 Distinct areas encompassing 
the TPN include the intraparietal sulcus, frontal eye field, and the middle temporal 
region.68,69 The DMN and TPN are functionally anti-correlated but not entirely 
mutually exclusive. The degree of independence between these paired networks varies 
depending on the nature of the cognitive operation/s being performed at any given 
time.70  
 Resting state, or default mode connectivity, has been shown to be disrupted in brain 
injured patients with associated disorders of consciousness.71 Additionally, and 
specifically, it has been shown that pathological co-activation of the TPN arises in 
delirium.72 Therefore, clinical instruments that can examine the type of thinking that is 
representative of these distinct paired networks may guide us towards a useful tool.     
Results  
Derivation of a set of consciousness tests   
Using the descriptions pertaining to each conscious milieu, we derived a set of 
candidate tests from first principles. There were no operationalized criteria against 
which the tests could be developed, as is the limiting factor for any instrument that 
purports to measure the content of consciousness. Accordingly, a blue -sky 
methodology or curiosity-driven approach, was used to generate a series of potential 
tests. An iterative method among a multidisciplinary team comprising a geriatrician, 
psychiatrist, philosopher, neuropsychologist, neurobiologist, physician, and 
neurologist was used to refine the questions until a consensus amongst all parties was 
reached.  
Candidate tests of consciousness that could apply to delirium  
Test of phenomenal me-ness  
The questions developed involved a personal experience either as of the self or of the 
non-self. Phenomenal me-ness would be demonstrated by a congruent answer e.g. 
question 1 below if the person seemed very happy and they articulated that they also 
felt very happy at the time of enquiry then that would be a correct response.  
1. Before you uttered your first word today, what did you do? Can you express 
how you felt at that time in terms of an emotion; happy, sad, indifferent?  
2. Did you have a break at any time today? Where were you? Did you have a 
conversation? Who shared the most personal thoughts in conversation?  
3. (Interoception:) Are you hungry or full? If I gave you a large tasty meal would 
you eat it all? Do you prefer being hungry or full?  
4. (Mineness:) What is the first thing you heard today? Did you make the noise or 
did it come from elsewhere? Have you ever made that noise?  
5. Did you have any thoughts today that were not your own?  
Tests of sensed experience  
Test items involved a recalled experience of each of the senses, which could be 
reasonably verifiable by an independent rater. Presentations of a multiple choice was 
included to reduce the likelihood that subjects would pass the test simply through 
superficial knowledge or platitudes. A correct answer for the purposes of the test 
would be one that was reasonably verifiable by a next of kin. Each sensory test may 
require a brief screen to assess integrity prior to commencement.  Similarly, for some 
of the tests long term memory memory, high frequency object naming and gnosia 
would be assumed. Failure in the test may require testing of the individual domains to 
exclude a focal neurological problem.  
Object identification; Object description of sensed experience, affinity for the 
experience, how the experience informed consciousness +-false dichotomy, objective 
verification from a loved one. Impairment in sensed consciousness would be 
registered upon a disparity between the subject and loved one’s interpretation of their 
answer e.g. ‘I like chalk.’ vs ‘He/she would have hated the feel of chalk.’  
Touch: What is this (touching chalk with eyes closed)? Describe it? Is it nice, bad or 
neutral? How does it make you feel (good, bad, indifferent)? Is it used to tell the time? 
Informant question (IQ): Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good day? 
There could also be a pleasant, or at least less noxious alternative question, such as 
‘what type of fabric do you like to wear? Could you make a table out of it?’ 
Smell: What is this (smell of cinnamon)? Describe the smell… Is it sweet or spicy? Is 
it nice, bad or neutral? How does it make you feel (good, bad, indifferent)? Is it used 
to flavour food or drinks? IC: Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good 
day?  
Sound: What is this (sound of kitten purring)? Describe the sound? Do you like it 
(good, bad, neutral)? How does it make you feel? (good, bad, indifferent). Can this 
animal bark? IQ: Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good day?  
Sight: What is this (visual clown)? What do you think he is trying to do? Do you like 
it (good bad neutral)? How does it make you feel? (good, bad, indifferent) Are his 
shoes too small? IQ: Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good day?  
Taste: What is this (taste of salt)? Describe the taste. Is it nice, bad or neutral? How 
does it make you feel (good, bad, indifferent)? Is it sweet? IQ: Would your loved one 
like or dislike this on a good day?  
Time perception: Is it day time or night time? Do you feel time is passing slowly in 
hospital? How long do you think you have been here (hours, days or weeks)? Are you 
a morning person or a night person? IQ: Would your loved one describe themselves as 
a morning or night person? Would you like to be woken up at this hour (picture of 
someone asleep with the moon out)?  
These are all tests that may rely on procedural memory and conditioned reflexes and 
so, to further evaluate the experiential sense, a further layer of complexity is added to 
the event to make it sufficiently probing: We have named these tests of putting the 
experiences together-conflicting multidimensionality. Failure on testing of conflicting 
multidimensionality would be incurred when a subject is anchored to the object (the 
clown) rather than the action of the object (anger of a clown) see table 1. 
Memory based upon sensed experience  
The questions targeted past experiences involving each of the senses that could be 
reasonably verifiable by an independent rater. Again, a false dichotomy was included 
in an effort to reduce the likelihood of subjects passing the test through superficial 
knowledge or platitudes. Again, Impairment in sensed experience would be registered 
upon a disparity between the subject and loved ones interpretation of their answer e.g. 
swimming in the sea ‘I loved swimming in the sea’ vs‘ he hated swimming in the sea’  
Object identification, Object description of sensed experience, affinity for the 
experience, how the experience informed consciousness +-false dichotomy.  
Do you remember a time you went swimming in the sea? (y/n) Where was it? If yes, 
was it warm or cold? Was it nice, bad, or neutral? How did it make you feel? (good, 
bad, indifferent). IQ: Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good day? Is a 
fridge warm/ Is an oven cold?*  
Name a subject that was taught at school? What was it about? Did you enjoy it? Was 
it nice, bad, or neutral? How did you feel during the class? (good, bad, indifferent). 
IQ: Would your loved one like or dislike this on a good day?  Is mathematics the same 
as art? Are science and physics related? 
Name your favourite dessert? Do you enjoy it? Is it nice, bad, or neutral? How does 
eating your favourite dessert make you feel? (good, bad, indifferent). IQ: Would your 
loved one like or dislike this on a good day? If it were here now would you put gravy 
on it?  
   
What is your favourite smell? Do you enjoy it? Is it nice bad or neutral? How does 
smelling this make you feel (good bad indifferent)? IQ: Would your loved one like or 
dislike this on a good day? If you could smell it now would it make you think of a 
flower?  
Name some music that you like? Do you enjoy it? Is it nice bad or neutral? How does 
listening to this make you feel (good bad indifferent)? IQ: Would your loved one like 
or dislike this on a good day? Does loud music help you sleep?  
Can you remember a time when you visited somewhere new? Can you recall 
something that you saw there? Did you enjoy seeing it? Was it nice bad or neutral? 
How did seeing it make you feel (good bad indifferent)? IQ: Would your loved one 
like or dislike this on a good day? Do you tend to see more things when travelling by 
day or by night?  
Reflective thinking versus the task engagement in the task positive state   
As we have discussed, functional network co-operation between the DMN and TPN is 
required for the realisation of full consciousness. In order to tap into these states, 
questions were developed that harnessed reflective thought and an executive planning 
task that related to it .67 The planning task is designed to be an externally verifiable 
aspect of the self-referential thought. A scenario was created that was thought likely 
to represent these cognitive proxies for the respective networks. In this instance, a 
world map was decided upon as it provides a template for imagining of self in 
another dimension (place) but with easily verifiable facts relatable to that location 
(see figure 1).  
(i)                 First question. Point to where we are now. Show me a place you would 
like to visit.  
(ii)               Second question. A reasonably well-known fact related to the geography.  
North America: Is this where the Statue of Liberty is located? Is this where cowboys 
came from? Was George Washington a president?  
South America: Are there are rainforests here? Does South America have seas or 
oceans around it? Is the Amazon River in South America?  
Antarctica: Is the weather generally warm here? Would you expect to see snow/ice 
here? Would you expect to see a camel here?  
Europe: Is Germany in Europe? Are there any castles in Europe? Is the Eiffel tower 
somewhere in Europe?  
Asia: Are chopsticks used in parts of Asia? Is the Great Wall of China somewhere in 
Asia?  
Africa: Are there lions in Africa? Are there deserts in Africa? It is generally cold in 
Africa?  
Other candidate cognitive proxies for the Default Mode/ Task positive states:  
Could you be dreaming right now? (y/n) How could you show that this isn’t a dream? 
e.g., pinch yourself  
Who was your best friend at school? Name something that you liked doing 
together.  Name a subject that you were better at?  
 Do you remember the last time you swam in the sea? Do you remember a time you 
bathed in water? Was it warm or cold? Is a fridge warm/ Is an oven cold?  
Are you a night owl or a “morning person”? Is being a morning person better for 
working late? Is being a night owl better if you want to see the sunrise?  
 Do you ever dream about driving? (y/n) Would it be safe to dream and drive at the 
same time?  
 Do you like dessert? Name your favourite dessert? If it were here now would you put 
gravy on it?  
Neil Armstrong was the first man on the moon. Would you like to visit the moon? Is 
the moon more visible by day rather than night?  
Can you swim? Does a person need gills to swim?  
Are you right or left handed? (if R) Can you feel your right thumb? Is your right 
thumb important for writing with a pen?  
Do you like the taste of coffee? Is it generally drunk hot or cold? Is coffee sweetened 
with salt?  
Do you prefer small or large gatherings of friends? A small gathering would always 
be noisier than a large one?  
   
Discussion  
A framework for consciousness, from the foundational pre-reflective state to 
experiential awareness up to higher order thinking involving paired functional 
networks are established concepts. Understanding consciousness in this way can help 
devise tests of measurement in each facet of consciousness; disturbance therein can 
help provide a rationale for clinical tests in the area of delirium. A multiprofessional 
team derived a number of candidate tests for each facet of consciousness thus 
described alongside pre-defined criteria from first principles.  What was developed 
were easily testable series of questions. The pre-reflective questions incorporated 
enquires with respect to the embodied self and ownership of thought, experiential 
questions invoked the senses and congruence with state of mind and reflective 
thinking questions drew on a scenario that was thought likely to evoke default mode 
and task positive thinking respectively. When there are currently no measures of 
consciousness used in the identification of delirium it seems an earnest beginning. 
Field testing these questions on healthy individuals may help develop normative 
values and establish how they can be used in combination. These questions can then 
be tested in the clinical arena as a potential screening tool to potentially more 
accurately diagnose delirium.   
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Table 1 showing tests of the sense experience as part of consciousness  
   






Chalk                    Chalk writing on a 
board  
   
Cinnamon  
   
                 Burnt cinnamon  
Kitten  
   
                  Kitten catching bird  
Clown  
   
                  A clown being angry  
   
Salt                    Salt being poured into 
a cup of tea  
   
Time                    Would you like to be 
woken up at this hour?  
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default mode/ task positive questions to follow  
   
 
 
